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The Influence of China’s Retaliatory Tariff on US. Automobile and Parts 
Exporters during US - China Trade War 
 
Jiayu Teng 






The Sino-US trade war began from late 2017 has had large influence on the global economy. 
After US imposed sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports for illegal unfair trade practice in 2018, 
China also launched retaliatory tariff to fight back. This study is mainly focus on the automobile 
and parts industry, which is one of the significant industries influenced by this trade war. Except 
analyzing the US manufactures, Germany, Korean and Japanese exporters who gain tariff relief 
are also included to establish a comparison with US firms in this research to analyze how net 
weight (kg), trade values ($) and unit price ($) be affected due to the changes in trade tariff. In 
addition, firm level data from those four countries are also used to show the fluctuation of sales 
of both imported and domestic produced foreign brand vehicles. From the result, although 
significance is shown that the China’s retaliatory tariff do have influence on US automobile and 
parts exports, the coefficient is positive which did not meet my original expectation. However, 
the analysis on other countries (German, Japan and Korea) shows that the relief in tariffs help to 
increase export quantities and values. Finally, the firm level data analysis shows that imported 
vehicles experienced a generally decreasing trend as more and more companies established 
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Introduction  
In 2017, the Trump administration formally complained that China has been receiving and 
benefiting from flows of American knowledge it had not properly acquired and in August, the 
Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) launched an investigation under section 301of 
the Trade Act of 1974 into “Chinese laws, policies and practices which may be harming 
American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology development”. Thereafter, in 
2018, the Trump administration started to impose sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports for illegal 
unfair trade practice. So far, the US has applied US$550 billion worth of Chinese products and 
total China retaliatory tariffs applied to US exports has reached US$185 billion.1 Among those 
retaliatory tariffs, American imported automobiles and parts accounted for a relatively large 
proportion. America, the second largest automobile and parts exporters to Chinese market, 
exported around US$12 billion in 2018, which occupied around 25% Chinese total imported 
automobiles and parts. Exporters from US do not only include US local brands, but also foreign 
brands who set up manufacturers in US. From July 2018, China imposed three rounds of tariffs 
on imported US made automobiles and parts with 25% tariffs increase and 5% tariffs increase 
respectively. Until January 1, 2019, China suspended the retaliatory tariffs on automobile and 
parts originating in the United States for three months to March 31, 2019. The suspension has 
been extended for another several months. However, because of the announcement made by the 
US government on May 10, 2019 that it would impose a 10% tariff on US$300 billions of goods 
imported from China, which will be implemented in two batches from September 1, 2019 and 
December 15, 2019, China decided to recover tariffs for automobile and parts from December 
15, 2019. In addition, in order to release the retaliatory tariffs influence on Chinese domestic 
producers and consumers, the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council announced the 
reduction of import tariff on automobile for other countries. From July 1, 2018, the tariffs for 
automobile with a tax rate of 25% and 20% respectively will be reduced to 15%. Tariffs on auto 
parts with tax rates of 8%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% were reduced to 6%.  
This paper explores how the Sino-US trade war influence automobile and parts exporters to 
Chinese market by analyzing monthly exports data of HS4 digits products for American 
manufactures and also compare to data from German, Korea and Japan who are the top 
                                                 
1 Philippines Economic Update: October 2019 Edition Resuming Public Investment, Fast Tracking Implementation, 
The World Bank  
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automobile and parts exporters during years 2015-2018. It is meaningful to show how the trade 
war influences both involved countries and also the global trade system. Moreover, the potential 
local and global welfare implications will be another point to focus on. In this paper, difference 
in difference regression model analysis is used for this trade policy adjustment. It is surprising to 
see that increase in trade tariffs will increase the total amount of exports quantity (in net weight 
kg) and cause an increase in trade values. The unit prices did not have any response in this short 
time period and have been kept in a constant level. The results shown do not meet the 
expectation I had initially, and I think it will be caused by the influence of the global supply 
chain that many other factors might have some effects on the trade of automobiles and parts 
between US and China. Moreover, scatter plots and regression lines have been sketched for 
quarterly sales of vehicles for American, German, Korean and Japanese automobile 
manufacturers in a 5-year interval from 2015 to September 2019. For here, we can see an 
obvious decline in US brand imported cars and also Germany imported vehicles manufactured in 
US. Although there is a decline in sales of imports, more and more companies are moving their 
manufacturers into domestic China. Sales of domestic produced foreign brand vehicles by 
foreign-affiliated firms displayed a rapid increasing trend in this 5-year interval.  
 
Literature Review 
Bown, Chad (2019) talks about the background of 2018 trade war and explains why this 
happened in his paper 2018 US-China Trade Conflict After 40 Years of Special Protection. It 
explained some key sources of trade friction triggered the 2018 crisis of protection. It is mainly 
due to concerns over the rising importance of China’s state-owned enterprises, industrial 
subsidies and its failure to reform and become more market-oriented. It introduces both the US 
and China special tariffs and acts of protection between 1980 and 2018 and US-China normal 
tariffs before the trade war. Author uses several figures to show the distribution of both US 
imports from China and Chinese imports from US covered by special tariffs in effect in 2018. In 
addition, through the bar chart of US imports from China covered by special tariffs in 2018, by 
product type, most percent of US imports of intermediate inputs from China were subject to 
special protection, threatening American producers’ continued integration with international 
supply chains. The paper uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key 
sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. In addition, the table given 
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out for the timeline of key events for US and China special tariffs arising in 2018 includes details 
information about the progress of this event, which provide an important help for me during my 
research. 
Amiti, Redding, Weinsterin (2019) explore the impacts of the Trump administration’s trade 
policy on both import and export prices and welfare in their paper The impact of the 2018 trade 
war on U.S. prices and welfare. The increase in the imports tariff cause the prices of 
intermediates and final goods rise significantly. By plotting figures for the evolution of 12-month 
proportional change in import prices by tariff wave and total import values, it is clear to see that 
much of the tariffs were passed on to U.S. importers and consumers instead of foreign exporters 
since tariffs have had little-to-no impact on the prices received by foreign exporters. In addition, 
the imposition of the tariffs had very large relative impacts on the amount of imports for affected 
countries and sectors. Besides price changes of imports, the regression models run by authors 
show that one percentage point increase in tariffs is associated with six percentage point fall in 
import quantities and a reduction in real income for U.S. consumers because of these tariffs. 
These kinds of impacts on import quantity and price and real income changes on U.S. consumers 
are also borne by consumers and importers in other countries who imposed retaliatory tariffs on 
U.S. exports. According to one of the features of “new trade theory”, authors also confirmed that 
increasing in trade barriers reduced welfare by restricting consumer’s ability to purchase new 
imported varieties.  
This paper finds empirical support for several arguments. Firstly, the full incidence of the tariff 
has fallen on domestic consumers instead of foreign exporters. Secondly, trade war reduces real 
income for U.S. consumers. Thirdly, the combined effect of input and output tariffs have raised 
the average price of U.S. manufacturing. Finally, the trade war caused dramatic adjustments in 
international supply chains.  
Lovely and Liang (2018) analyze the impact of section 301 on high-technology Chinese exports 
on American firms in their paper Trump tariffs primarily hit multinational supply chains harm 
US technology competitiveness. The trump administration complained that China has been 
receiving and benefiting from flows of American knowledge it had not properly acquired. Such 
misappropriation reduces the return to American innovation and diverts American jobs to China. 
However, the products on the tariff hit list are largely inputs in American production and the 
taxes would decrease American competitiveness. From 2014, there are large proportional of 
4
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Chinese exports were foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The trade pattern between US and 
China shows that multinational firms have enhanced the value of their innovative activity by 
using East Asian supply chains to lower their cost of production. From tables in this paper, it is 
clear to see that large share of targeted US imports from China are computer and electronic 
products, miscellaneous manufacturing commodities and electrical equipment. However, by the 
figure of share of exports by wholly foreign-owned enterprises and equity joint venture in high-
tech manufacturing from 2002 to 2013, we can see around 50 percent are wholly owned foreign 
enterprises, which helps to confirm that Section 301 tariffs cause large impact on foreign owned 
enterprises who produce in China and it drives up for US-based manufactures and disadvantage 
American workers competing in global markets. Therefore, tariffs and quotas are ineffective at 
stemming knowledge flows between innovative countries and developing countries. 
Although my paper will focus on China’s retaliatory tariff, these two papers help give me ideas 
about how to analyze the influence on import products suffered from tariffs not only from side of 
producers but also from side of domestic consumers and the changes in international supply 
chains related to the fluctuation in trade tariffs. 
Deborah L. Swenson (2012) analyzes the economic effects of China’s content-based import 
tariffs on imported auto parts during the year 1997-2009 in his paper The influence of Chinese 
Trade Policy on Automobile Assembly and parts. During this period, China’s policy penalized 
firms that assembled automobiles with less than 60% Chinese content. As foreign-affiliated firms 
were more likely to exceed the content ceiling, the paper assesses whether foreign-affiliated 
firms changed their inputs sources by using more Chinese product to avoid the content-based 
tariffs. The difference in difference regressions are estimated by using fixed effects panel 
regression. Authors mainly used two dependent variables which are import quantities and import 
prices. It shows that there is evidence of price reduction for importing car parts during the policy 
years by foreign-affiliated firms. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between auto parts 
imports prices and the implementation of China’s content-based policy. However, authors did 
not have any evidence from import quantities side, which show that foreign-affiliated firms did 
not adjust their import quantities for parts at least in the short-run as it is difficult for them to 
switch suppliers. Overall, it appears that affected firms tried to reduce their reported prices and 
dutiable values in order to avoid or release the impact of content-based tariffs. In contrast, there 
is no statistical significance that import quantities will be affected.  
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My paper also shows how a trade policy given out by Chinese government influence the foreign 
automobile and parts manufactures. In my later results, I also find out that the increase in tariffs 
in auto parts did not have significant influence on those foreign-affiliated firms by continuing 
increase in the sales of domestic produced foreign brand vehicles.  
Flaaen, Hortaçsu and Tintelnot (2019) analyze several rounds of U.S. import restrictions against 
washing machines in their paper The Production relocation and Price Effects of U.S. Trade 
Policy: The Case of Washing Machines. They estimate the price effect of these import 
restrictions by comparing the price changes of washers with those of other appliances. 
Production relocation effects, price changes by domestic brands, and price changes of 
complementary goods all contribute to those measures. During three major rounds of import 
restrictions (the 2012 antidumping duties against Korea, 2016 antidumping duties against China 
and 2018 global-oriented safeguard tariffs) firms shifted production following each new trade 
policy- first from Mexico/Korea to China, then to Thailand/Vietnam, and finally to the U.S. By 
using detailed micro-level data on retail prices, the 2016 antidumping duties on Chinese 
production had little effect on consumer prices as firms relocate production and hence moderate 
the effects of the trade policy to consumer prices. However, they find large effects on consumer 
prices in 2018 global-oriented safeguard tariffs. It shows that if the tariff induces the firm to shift 
to a location with overall lower costs of production, consumer prices could actually decrease. By 
using a simple model of production relocation, prices and tariffs, authors show that the presence 
of fixed costs and production relocation imply that the effect of tariffs on US prices is non-
monotone. By applying the prices regression of washers and dryers (the complementary goods 
for washers), the figure of log price regression demonstrates that prices of washing machines 
jump shortly after the safeguard tariffs and also for the price of dryers.  However, the price 
changes on other shocks also have impact on price of washers. Under section 201, tariffs were 
implemented on aluminum and steel for several time. In order to relief the impact of price 
changes of major applications for washer, authors add control group in the model to difference-
out the effect of increase in appliances’ prices.  
My paper’s strategy is a little bit similar to this but analyzing different goods. This paper not 
only includes the final product - washing machines but also considers about the tariff influence 
on the complementary goods and resources used during production process. The regression run 
by authors give me ideas about adding considerable control groups during building my model.  
6





To evaluate the effects of China’s retaliatory tariffs on the automobiles and parts exporters, 
detailed exports data from 4 top exporting countries for the years 2015- 2018 are studied. 
Unfortunately, the latest data for year 2019 was not available yet so my data only includes to 
December 2018. All automobile and parts data began with HS2-digit 87 from HS8701 to 
HS8716 are included in the dataset. The lists for retaliatory tariffs on US automobile and parts 
announced by the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council exhibit that HS8703, 
HS8704, HS8706 and HS8708 are major HS4-digit products been influenced, where the tariffs 
on HS8703 and HS8704 have been increased by 25% and the tariffs on HS8706 and 8709 have 
been increased by 5%. The monthly exports data provided by United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) includes net weight (kg), trade values ($) and unit price ($) 
for these four HS4-digit products. By using these data, it is worth to analyze that by comparing 
other three countries’ exports data for same HS4-digit products, how China’s retaliatory tariff on 
US influence the quantity and value of automobile and parts products.  
The second part of data is quarterly sales of vehicles for American, Germany, Korean and 
Japanese automobile manufacturers including both imported and domestically produced vehicles 
in China from January 2015 to September 2019 from Bloomberg terminal. There are fourteen 
automobile manufacturers including five US companies, four German companies, two Korean 
companies and three Japanese companies.2 These companies are the most popular foreign 
automobile manufacturers in Chinese market, which accounted for around 60% of the total 





















                                                 
2 Ssang Yong and Chrysler do not have domestic production in China. 
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Ssang Yong 
                                                                   Table 1: list of 14 foreign automobile brands 
 
The third part of data will be the detailed China’s retaliatory tariff on US imported automobile 
and parts with specific timeline. There are three taxation committee announcement (No.5, No.6 
and No.8) and each of them was implemented on July 6, 2018, August 23, 2018 and September 
24, 2018.  The tariffs for automobile and parts increased 25 % and 5% respectively. The tariff 
suspension from January 1, 2019 was announced on Dec 14, 2018 and the recovery of tariffs 
from Dec 15, 2019 was announced on August 23, 2019. In addition, during this period, in order 
to decrease the impact of tariffs on Chinese consumer, the state council issued the announcement 
of reducing import tariffs on automobile and parts for other countries from July 1, 2018. The 
tariffs for automobile with a tax rate of 25% and 20% respectively were reduced to 15% and 
tariffs on auto parts with tax rates of 8%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% were all reduced to 6%. 
After the tax reduction, the average tax rate of China's auto vehicles is 13.8%, and the average 
tax rate of auto parts is 6%. 
 
Empirical framework  
Because of the retaliatory tariff on imported automobile and parts originating from US, my 
assumption will be that after July 2018, the starting period of tariffs imposition, the trade values 
and the total amount of imports will decrease because of the increase in market prices. 
Manufacturers might try to find other alternative suppliers to avoid an increase in automobile 
production costs. For the change in unit price, according to what I mentioned before, since the 
market prices will increase after the additional tariffs, automobile parts exporters might decrease 
their unit prices of exports in order to help them stem the loss of Chinese customers.  
The second assumption I made based on the fourteen foreign automobile manufacturers data is 
that the amount of sales of imported vehicles, not only American brand but also others made in 
US, will show a decrease from July 2018 because of the increase in imported tariffs on 
automobile originating from US. The amount of sales of domestically produced vehicles from 
foreign-affiliated firms will increase as producers will adjust the production into domestic China 
with lower cost of labor and transportation costs in order to avoid high import tariffs.  
Since the research will treat US as a treatment group and other countries as control groups to 
analyze whether the trade policy change will have influence on the treatment group over a period 
8
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of time, I employ difference in difference regressions analysis. Based on the pervious 
assumption, the analysis begins with the log of trade values as the dependent variable. The 
variance between trade values of different products will be reduced by logging the values. For 
the independent variable, I will have two dummy variables. The first will be the exposure which 
determines whether it is the country who had been imposed the retaliatory tariff. If the exposure 
is US, the dummy variable will be one and if not, the dummy variable will be zero. The second 
dummy variable will be exposure*post, where post means that if it is the period after July 2017, 
post will be one and if it is before that period, post will be zero. Exposure* post will be one only 
if both the exposure is US and the period is post July 2017. All other conditions will generate 
zero. After having both dependent and independent variables, the model will also have three 
fixed effects, which are period fixed effects, country fixed effects and product fixed effects. The 
following is the regression framework for trade values:  
In Tradevaluesipt = ß0 + ß1exposurept + ß2 post*exposurep + ft + fp + fi +eipt.          (1) 
For here, i represents exposure. p is products in HS4-digits and t represents post time period. In 
addition, ft, fp and fi represent the fixed effects in time, products and country respectively.  
The second regression will use the log value of net weight in kilograms as a dependent variable 
and still using two same dummy variables and three fixed effects to find out whether the amount 
of exports’ net weight will be influenced by China’s retaliatory tariffs. The following is my 
regression framework for net weights:  
In Netweightipt = ß0 + ß1exposurept + ß2 post*exposurei + ft + fp + fi + eipt.           (2) 
The third regression will use unit prices as the dependent variable with same dummy variables 
and fixed effects as the previous two regressions. This model will help to analyze the relationship 
between new trade tariffs and unit prices given out by exporters. The following is the regression 
framework for unit prices:  
Unitpriceipt = ß0 + ß1exposurept + ß2 post*exposurei + ft + fp + fi + eipt.          (3) 
Moreover, although China imposed retaliatory tariffs on US imposed automobile and parts, the 
tariffs for other countries’ imported automobile reduced to 15% from 25% and 20% respectively 
and tariffs on auto parts reduced to 6% from 8%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25%. Therefore, I also 
analyse whether the decrease of tariffs on other countries will cause the amount of imports from 
Japan, Korea and German in control group rise as auto manufacturers and consumers will try to 
9
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find substitutes. The regression models for each country in the control group will also contain the 
post dummy variable. Post will be zero when the period is before July 2018 and otherwise be 
one. Log of Trade values, log of net weight and unit price will be three dependent variables. The 
following is the regression frameworks:  
In Tradevaluespt = ß0 + ß1Exposurept + ft + fp + ept          (4) 
In Netweightpt = ß0 + ß1Exposurept + ft + fp + ept               (5)    
Unitpricept = ß0 + ß1Exposurept + ft + fp +ept                        (6)    
In these three regressions, country will not be the control variable as I will run regressions for 
each country’s exporting data.  
 
Results  
Firstly, I run the difference in difference regression model to analyze how automobile and parts 
originating from US were influenced by the China’s retaliatory tariffs. In table 2, it shows results 
for three regression models with equation (1), (2) and (3). It is clear to see that p-value for the 
regression of trade values with usa_post as the independent variable is less than 0.001 which 
means that it is highly statistically significant. However, the coefficient is positive which means 
that the rise in tariffs on US automobile and parts have positive influence on total amount of 
trade values. When the dummy variable is one, it will cause a 700% increase in the trade values.  
The p-value for second regression on net weights with usa_post as the independent variable is 
also smaller than 0.001, which means it is highly statistically significant. The positive coefficient 
represents that the tariffs on US imports will increase the amount of purchased from Chinese 
domestic manufacturers and consumers by 540%. It can also partly help explain why trade 
values from the first regression shows the negative correlation. However, I did not find any 
statistical significance for the third regression model on unit prices. From the raw data, the prices 
were almost kept at a constant level. The data shown here is totally inverse with my assumption. 
From my perspective, there should be something wrong. It might because I missed some part of 
tariff data on automobiles and parts. Moreover, it might because that although the tariff only 
imposed on a couple of HS4-digit products, the whole automobile and parts export markets 
between US and China have been affected by the trade war. Therefore, I might need to include 
some other industries which did not been imposed any retaliatory tariff to act a more compelling 
control variable.  
10
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Secondly, the regression models with equation (4), (5) and (6) have been run for each country 
(German, Korea and Japan) separately in order to show that whether the decline in automobile 
and parts tariffs help to increase the amount of imports. For here, I have run a simple ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression with post as the independent variable. From table 3, it is clear to 
see that decrease in trade tariffs has positive influence on Germany log of trade values and net 
weight as p-value shows the statistical significance and the coefficient is positive. However, 
there is no evidence found that unit price was influenced by tariffs.  
 
Table 2: Difference in Difference model: Influence of China’s retaliatory tariff on US imports  
 
 
Table 3: Influence of tariff decrease on Germany imports  
 
According to table 4 and 5 for Japan and Korea respectively, the p-values for regression model 
of the log value for net weights as the dependent variable both show statistically significance  
(p-value < 0.05). It means that the net weights for Korea and Japan also influenced by the 
decline in imports’ tariffs. Different with the p-value for regression model of log for trade values 
in Korea and German, p-values in Japan did not show any significance here, which represents the 
11
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tariffs relief on Japanese imports did not increase the trade value of imports purchased by 
China’s domestic manufactures and consumers from Japan. From the regression on unit price, I 
did not find any evidence that tariffs will have influence on that, so unit prices for products were 
constantly hold at a certain level during the trade war. Since we saw significance on net weights 
with price level hold constant, theoretically the trade values should increase. One of the reasons I 
am thinking about is that since the unit price is collected in US dollar in my database but the 
purchasing price among daily trade could be in Japanese yen between Japan and China. 
Therefore, during the currency transfer, the differences in daily exchange rate could omit the 
actual changes happened in unit price. From this aspect, we cannot make sure whether the unit 
price hold at a constant level and this will also influence the trade values.  
 
Table 4: Influence of tariff decrease on Japanese imports  
 
 
Table 5: Influence of tariff decrease on Korean imports  
 
The second part of results are shown based on the firm level data in order to analyze how sales of 
US imported vehicles influenced by the 25% increase of China’s retaliatory tariffs. From figure1 
in appendix, it includes four diagrams showing quarter sales of vehicles during year 2015 to 
12
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September 2019 from US and three other countries. The imported automobile from those four 
countries accounts for more than 50% of total imported vehicles in Chinese market. It is clear to 
see from the diagram that regression lines that for US imported vehicles all show decreasing 
trends except sales of Chrysler stayed at a constant level. If we carefully look into the scatter 
plots for each brand’s sales in appendix (figure 3), they show that from period July 2018, the 
sales experienced a larger jump more clearly. Although China suspended the 25% increase in 
tariffs from January 2019, the sales continued to slump instead of picking up as we expected. 
According to the sales of imported vehicles from other three countries, Japanese brands show 
moderate increase in total sales. Most Japanese brand automobile served for Asia market are 
produced in south east Asia like Thailand, Indonesia and Philippine. Although they do have 
some factories in North America, those automobiles are mostly sold in Europe and North 
American countries. Therefore, the retaliatory tariff will have less influence on Japanese brand. 
However, Germany brands were actually more suffered from the trade-war between US and 
China. The scatter plots for sales each Germany brand in appendix (figure 4) show huge declines 
after July 2018, though the regression lines in Figure 1 look moderate along the whole 5-year 
period. In addition, since the Germany brand vehicles are relatively more luxury compare to 
other countries’, consumers will be more sensitive to the increase in prices and sales will be 
more elastically influenced by tariffs. Finally, we also see a reduction in sales of Korean brands, 
but most of them are manufactured in local Korea. This kind of trend might not be explained by 
tariff influence. Other factors such as consumer tastes, brands’ advertising and post-sales service 
can be considered. 
As the high automobiles demand in China, more and more foreign brand moved their 
manufacturers into China by forming foreign-affiliated firms and sell vehicles domestically in 
order to avoid the high import tax rate and transportation costs. From figure 2, it is obvious to see 
that most brand increased their sales of domestic produced vehicles along this 5-year period. 
Although there was a 5% increase in auto parts tariffs from July 2018, we did not see any 
considerable influence on US or other brand manufacturers. Deborah. L Swenson (2012) talked 
about whether foreign-affiliated firms changed their inputs source when they encounter China’s 
penalization on any firm that assembled cars with less than 60% Chinese contents. The author 
did not find evidence that foreign-affiliated firms will change the input source but only release 
13
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the policy influence by reducing import transaction prices and import quantities. Therefore, 
China’s temporary retaliatory tariffs on auto parts, which is only 5%, did not have a considerable 
influence on foreign-affiliated firms since it is difficult for them to change their input source in 







Conclusively, although I find out significance that the China’s retaliatory tariff do have influence 
on US automobile and parts exports, the coefficient is positive which did not meet my original 
expectation and it is obvious that there might be something wrong during the analysis. The first 
reason could be that I missed some parts of the trade tariffs imposed on HS4-digit products, which 
will cause errors during the data analysis. The second reason will be that although the retaliatory 
tariffs were imposed on part of the automobile and parts exports, the whole automobile market 
will be influenced by the trade war. Therefore, I need to add more other industries that did not 
influenced by any increase of tariffs in order to have more considerable control variables in the 
regression model and help to omit any possible biased factors. The third reason I am thinking of 
is that the global supply chain makes exports and imports from any part of world have a significant 
connection between each other. This may cause many other factors influence the trade between 
US and China. The analysis on other countries (German, Japan and Korea) shows that the relief in 
tariffs help to increase export quantities and values.  
In the second part of firm level data analysis, it is clear to see the current trend of vehicles sales in 
Chinese market that the tariffs increase on imported automobiles originating from US not only 
influence the selling of US brand but also Germany brand and any other foreign brands producing 
in US. However, more and more companies chose to form foreign-affiliated firms and move their 
manufacturers into domestic China to better serve the Chinese market. This trend can also partly 
explain the general decreasing trend from those imported vehicles diagrams shown in appendix. 
Therefore, I think the decreasing of general US imported vehicles were not only influenced by the 
increase in trade tariffs but also because of the increasing selling of domestic produced foreign 
brand vehicles. Consumers purchasing intention are now moving from imported vehicles to 
domestic produced foreign automobiles by having more suitable price and more convenient post-
14
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sales service. For further research, I will try to solve the positive coefficient issue by adding more 
trade industries as control group and recheck if I missed any trade tariffs. I also would like to 
include 2019 data when it is available, and this will definitely help to make the results more precise 
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Figure 2: Sales of domestic produced foreign brand vehicles  
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